One of the main topics in the 'Uruguay-Round' was the istitutional strengthening of the dispute-settlement procedure within the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). A change was necessary after the member countries of the GATT had become aware of the incapabilties of the current dispute-settlement system. The main problem of the GATT dispute-settlement procedure was the ability of the dispute parties to block or ton delay the dispute settlement procedure. An effective and fast settlement of trade conflicts was therefore difficult. This institutional defect was supposed to be corrected by the establishment of the WTO (World Trade Organization) and the installation of the new dispute-settlement procedure. Obstruction by one of the dispute parties was not possible anymore. The practical implications of the new WTO dispute-settlement system are somewhat unclear. The number of the cases has been rising since 1995, when the WTO dispute-settlement came into force. Additionally, a number of intensive trade conflicts within the WTO still exist. The central point of this project addresses the effectiveness of the institutional change in the dispute-settlement procedure. Did the institutional change from GATT to WTO modify the trade conflicts in the GATT/WTO system? And as an overall question: Do institutions determine and regulate the intensity of trade conflicts or do other independent variables determine the outcome as well? Arguments concerning the intensity of trade conflicts derived from Neoliberal Institutionalism, Realism and Domestic-Level-Approaches are tested by quantitative and qualitativ methods. First results confirms the view of Neoliberal Institutionalism. The institutional change in the dispute-settlement procedure seems to have a significant effect on the intensity of trade conflicts within the GATT/WTO dispute-settlement system.
