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The governance of religious orders. Management and control structures in Catholic orders

Ref. 10684

Description générale

Période concernée

Mittelalter bis 2011

Région géographique

-

Informations géographiques additionnelles

Deutschsprachiger Raum (A,D,CH)

Résumé

There exists a broad literature on the spirituality, theology, history, arts and architecture of monasteries and orders. In contrast, less attention has been paid to the economic merits of religious orders, despite their groundbreaking contributions to the development of the western economic world and work morale (e.g. Faust, 1997; Kieser, 1987; Moulin, 1965). Monasteries can be viewed as pioneers of governance which have had a major impact on the development of the economy in Europe. On the one hand, the great economic success of numerous monasteries in medieval times serves as an example of the efficient organization of commercial enterprises. On the other hand, the creation of wealth led to the temptation of misuse. As a reaction, sophisticated governance systems were established within religious orders. However, up until now, a systematic, economic analysis of the governance of religious orders did not exist. Our analysis of the governance of selected religious orders is undertaken from a behaviorally informed principal agent viewpoint. We not only aim at understanding the governance of various orders in a comparative way, but also at drawing conclusions beyond the field of religious orders. Our research is intended to provide deeper insights into the functioning of the governance structures and processes. In recent years, the world economic crisis and the huge scandals related to excessive manager compensation and fraudulent bookkeeping has fueled the discussion about good governance. Most political and economic leaders recommend strengthening external control mechanisms, such as tightening the law or introducing new monitoring measures. However, religious orders illustrate that internal governance mechanisms, such as selection, socialization or participation, and a particular configuration of external audit, offer promising alternatives for reducing agency problems and enhancing governance quality.

Résultats

The first project opens with a historical review of the abbots in the Benedictine monastery of Engelberg. Several weak abbots, which abused their powers in various ways or were simply overwhelmed, are elicited. By differentiating between good and bad abbots, the effectiveness of specific governance instruments is determined. In the following, some important results are summarized. Democratic elections yield a higher number of capable leaders. Further, abbots who were socialized inside the particular monastery and who demonstrated good performance before they were elected have a better performance record as monastic leaders. These circumstances point towards functioning participation, selection, and socialization mechanisms. On the level of the religious order, the survivability of an average Benedictine monastery of almost 500 years indicates sophisticated governance structures. Benedictine monasteries were rarely closed because of principal agency problems such as mismanagement or a relaxation of discipline (for more details see also Inauen and Frey, 2010). In the second part of the paper, the governance structures and processes are portrayed in detail before they are connected with current concepts in economy. Strikingly, monastic governance has relied on internal control procedures to great success. Three major conclusions are identified. First, instead of emphasizing outside control, the religious orders heavily rely on the embeddedness of members in common value systems. To ensure that common value systems are suitable to guide the individual behavior of their members, they build on careful selection and rigorous socialization processes. Second, the participation rights of the padres and brothers are of interest: co-determination and inside control via the voice of the members not only actively direct attention to firm-specific knowledge but also promote the principle of checks and balances by reducing agency problems. Third, external governance is organized in a particular way. This aspect is deepened in the next essay. From the internal governance mechanisms we move on to the external governance of the religious orders. The jurisdiction, e.g. the Canon law of the Catholic Church, or market mechanisms are left aside. Relevant beyond the monastic field is a third pillar of external governance, the monastic audit known as visitations. The administration of the umbrella organizations sends visitors to the local organizations to monitor the financial and spiritual state of the communities. Against the trend in many organizations, where performance is increasingly controlled via output control and ex post evaluations, in the religious orders, alternative forms of control are applied to steer the behaviour of the religious members. With the examination of current sexual abuse cases and rule violations it is shown that a concentration on process- and clan control is effective in reducing misconduct. Not solely relying on output control, but equally on alternatives such as process- and clan control, promises an enhancement of the auditing success. Great importance is attached to a careful implementation of the auditing processes as well. Trust in the visitors, secrecy in the talks, or an effort to convey an understanding of the visitations necessity, are key elements in an effective visitation process. Further, in the last decades, the visitations are completed with additional services, exceeding bare monitoring aspects. The monastic audit is used to strengthen faith and identity, to develop the community and to assist individuals with problems. In directing the behavior of the people by strengthening identity or by improving their living conditions, an entirely different way of control developed. A historical view completes the analysis and emphasizes the monastic visitations as a real success story. The third contribution connects external and internal governance and investigates their influence on the motivation of religious members. The object of this last study is the the work motivation of the padres and brothers. Self Determination Theory (Gagné and Deci, 2005; Deci and Ryan, 1985; 2000) is chosen as a theoretical foundation. Simply spoken, the theory assumes that the satisfaction of the basic psychological needs - autonomy, competence and relatedness - affects motivation or more specifically fosters intrinsic motivation. The propositions of Self Determination Theory turn out to be valid in a monastic context as well. For instance, democratic voice, i.e. the satisfaction of the needs autonomy and competence, increases intrinsic motivation, whereas a strongly regulated daily routine restricts autonomy and acts as an extrinsic motivator. However, the specific context indicates further influencing factors, which is why we broaden the theory in two directions. First, faith and religion as a motivational force is ignored in Self Determination Theory. Our analysis illustrates that the need for spirituality can be seen as a fourth basic need, equally essential for the padres and brothers. The importance of faith is illustrated with concrete cases. For example, if the religious connect their work with a divine purpose, for instance to experience God in their work, intrinsic motivation increases significantly. Second, it is crucial if the padres and brothers accept the restrictions and control structures. If the governance structures are approved, for example, because they are seen as a legacy of a specific monastic tradition, intrinsic motivation can be maintained, and a crowding effect is absent. § From these three contributions, an overall conclusion can be drawn. Like a leitmotiv, the emphasis on internal governance mechanisms recurs in all three essays. In the first part of the project, they are analyzed in detail and checked for their effectiveness. The last part connects internal governance with motivation development and confirms their crucial role for intrinsic motivation. Internal governance even is present in the second part of the project, where external visitations are in the fore. The monastic audit not only assesses the state of a community, but actively monitors and fosters internal control mechanisms. Thus, visitations can also be seen as an impetus for reflection and for renewing the community from the inside. An excellent example is clan control. The visitors carefully consider how the members of a community cooperate and how fraternal correction and mutual motivation are working. Internal control is essential for all of the examined religious orders. Applied seriously, these control instruments have served them well.